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Rating Ination versus Deation:
On Procyclical Credit Ratings
Yongmin Chen, Dingwei Gu, and Zhiyong Yao
Abstract
Credit rating agencies play a crucial role in nancial markets. There are
two competing views regarding their behavior: some argue that they engage in
rating ination, while others suggest that they deate ratings. This article o¤ers
a rationale that reconciles the two opposite arguments. We nd that both rating
ination and rating deation can occur in equilibrium. Furthermore, we show
that credit rating is procyclical: rating ination is more likely to happen in a
boom while rating deation is more likely to happen in a recession.
Nobody establishes a rating agency in order to help anybody.
 The Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk.1
[The investment] could be structured by cows and we would rate it.
 Analyst from one of the main CRAs in an email, April 5, 2007.2
1 Introduction
The "Big Three" credit rating agencies (CRAs), Standard and Poors, Moodys, and
Fitch, have played a critical role in the capital markets by assessing and spreading
information about default likelihoods and recovery rates of securities. Credit ratings
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1"EU leaders blame the euro crisis on American credit rating agencies" by Daniel Hannan, The
Telegraph, July 7th, 2011.
2Securities and Exchange Commission (2008, page 12)
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assigned by them have profound impacts on the welfare of both borrowers and investors.
Favorable ratings allow rms or countries to borrow at better terms and thus positively
a¤ect their values or economies. The ratings allow uninformed investors to quickly
evaluate the risk properties of numerous individual securities by a well-known simple
rating symbol, and are thus used extensively in their investment decisions. In fact,
many investment policies or government regulations are built on credit ratings. For
example, some institutional investors, such as pension funds and money market funds,
can invest only in investment-grade securities; others, such as insurance companies and
commercial banks, are restricted to use di¤erent capital amount based on the ratings
of assets they hold. Therefore, the quality of credit ratings is essential for the e¤ective
operation of the nancial market, and huge losses could arise if rating agencies fail to
provide accurate and timely ratings.
The "Big Three" have been widely criticized during the recent global nancial
crisis, including their roles in both the subprime crisis and the on-going European debt
crisis. But the criticism itself appears inconsistent. On the one hand, the CRAs are
accused of being too cozy with the companies and the nancial products they rate
(rating ination) and bearing a responsibility for the crisis. Well-known examples are:
numerous structured nance securities or toxic assets were given the highest possible
credit ratings before the subprime crisis; Lehman Brothers remained AAA rating right
before its bankruptcy, so were Enron (2001) andWorld.com (2002). On the other hand,
the CRAs are accused of being too focused on a companys or a countrys bottom lines
and downgrading their ratings without listening to their explanations (rating deation).
For example, in 2007, as housing prices began to tumble, Moodys downgraded 83
percent of the $869 billion mortgage-backed securities it had rated at the AAA level in
2006; on August 5, 2011, S&P downgraded U.S. debt for the rst time in U.S. history,
by one notch from AAA to AA+; since the spring of 2010, one or more of the Big
Three put Greece, Portugal, and Ireland to "junk" status, and in January 2012, amid
continued eurozone instability, S&P downgraded nine eurozone countries, stripping
France and Austria of their triple-A ratings.
Accordingly, existing studies on credit ratings are also mixed and divided into two
opposing views (Bae, Kang, and Wang, 2010). The rst is the rating deation view,
which argues that there exists a secular tightening trend of rating standards, followed
by a downward trend in credit ratings over time. For example, Blume, Lim, and
MacKinlay (1998) use a panel data on rmss credit ratings for a sample period of
1978-1995 to show this result; and Amato and Furne (2004), Jorion, Shi, and Zhang
(2009), and Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2010) conrm the same result using more
recent sample periods. The second view, inspired by the recent subprime crisis, is
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rating ination. A burgeoning literature, both theoretical (e.g., Bolton, Freixas, and
Shapiro, 2012; Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet, 2009; Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009)
and empirical (e.g., Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Gri¢ n and Tang, 2012; He, Qian,
and Strahan, 2012), argues that the issuer-pay business model, the rating shopping,
and the competition among rating agencies have reduced CRAsincentive to provide
accurate informative and timely ratings, leading to rating ination.
In this article, we o¤er a rationale that reconciles the aforementioned two seemingly
inconsistent views on CRAs. In a simple two-period reputation model, we show that
(i) both rating ination and rating deation can occur in equilibrium, and (ii) credit
ratings are procyclical: rating ination is more likely to occur in a boom while rating
deation is more likely to occur in a recession.
In our model, a CRA can be either an honest or an opportunistic type; an investor
can be either a sophisticated or naive type; and a security can be either a good or
a bad type. The CRA receives a noisy signal about the quality of the security and
issues a good or a bad rating upon the request of the security issuer. The issuer will
pay for and publish the good ratings, but not the bad ones. The honest CRA always
reports the true signal, while the opportunistic CRA chooses the rating to maximize
its expected payo¤s. The sophisticated investors update their beliefs rationally, while
the naive investors take the ratings at face value.
The opportunistic CRA faces the trade-o¤between the current benet, which is the
rating fee paid by the issuer upon receiving a favorable rating, and the future reputation
cost. If the reputation cost is su¢ ciently small, the CRA will inate the rating; if the
reputation cost is su¢ ciently large, the CRA will deate the rating in order to preserve
the reputation; only when the reputation cost is in the intermediate range, the CRA
will rate truthfully. We then relate the result to business cycles. During the boom, the
default probability of the security is low, thus the reputation loss of lying is low, and
the opportunistic CRA tends to inate the rating. During the recession, the default
probability of the security is high, thus the reputation cost is high when a good-rating
security fails, and the CRA will more likely deate the rating to preserve its reputation.
Scrutiny on CRAs during the recent nancial crisis has generated many new studies.
Most of them focus on the issue of rating ination. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012)
combine three sources for rating ination: CRAs understating risk to attract business;
issuers rating shopping behavior, and the existence of trusting or naive investors.
They show that competition can make the rating ination problem even worse as it
facilitates rating shopping, and rating ination are more likely to happen during boom
when investors are more optimistic. Complementary to Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro
(2012), we nd that in addition to rating ination, rating deation is also possible in
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equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that rating is procyclical. Bar-Isaac and Shapiro
(2013) also discuss credit ratings over business cycles, but they demonstrate that rating
quality is countercyclical, that is, a CRA is more likely to issue less accurate ratings
in a boom than in a recession. Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2013) study the incentives
of CRAs to issue unsolicited ratings, and they show that unsolicited ratings are lower
than solicited ones. Like Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2012), they also nd that the rating
standard is countercyclical. Our procyclical-rating result di¤ers from both Bar-Isaac
and Shapiro (2013) and Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2013).3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 shows how both rating ination and rating deation may occur in equilibrium.
Section 4 introduces economic states to the model and demonstrates that ratings are
procyclical. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a model that builds on Bolton et al. (2012). There are three kinds of
risk-neutral agents: a CRA, issuers, and a unit mass of investors. Issuers seek external
funding by selling a security to investors. There are two types of securities: good (eg) or
bad (eb). Good securities do not fail, while bad ones fail with probability p: Both types
of securities generate the same return R if not fail, and zero otherwise: All investors and
issuers believe ex ante that a security is good with probability 1
2
: Assume (1  p
2
)R < r,
where r is the reservation return that the investors need for one unit of the investment.
Thus, without further information, the investors are not willing to buy the security.
There are two periods, and there is an issuer in each period. At the beginning of
period 1, in order to sell the security, the issuer approaches the CRA for a rating. The
CRA rst posts a fee ; then receives a private signal  2 fg; bg with the following
information content:
Pr(g j eg) = Pr(b j eb) = ; where 1
2
<  < 1:
After that, the CRA produces a credit rating: m = G (good) or m = B (bad). Assume
(1  (1  )p)R > r; that is, an investor with reliable information that the security is
good is willing to purchase it. After observing the rating, the issuer chooses either to
buy and publish the rating or not to do so.
3Other related studies include: Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011); Goel and Thakor (2010); Mariano
(2012); Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009); Opp, Opp, and Harris (2010); and Skreta and
Veldkamp (2009).
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Proportion  of the investors are naive, while the rest are sophisticated, with
0 <   1. Both types of investors observe the rating published. The sophisticated
investors know that the CRA can be either the honest type (H) or the opportunistic
type (O), and that the ex ante probability of having an honest type is : But the
naive investors regard the CRA trustworthy and thus take its rating at face value. The
honest CRA will always report the true signal it receives about a security, whereas the
opportunistic CRA reports the rating which maximizes its expected payo¤s.
If the security is issued, at the end of the period, both types of investors observe
whether it is a success or a failure. The sophisticated investors will then nd out
whether or not the CRA lied by checking the report, the data and the facts. If the
CRA is found lying, the sophisticated investors know that the CRA is an opportunistic
type for sure. If the CRA is not found lying, the sophisticated investors update their
beliefs about the CRAs type accordingly. But the naive investors remain naive: Once
the "G" rating security failed, they punish the CRA by ignoring its future reports.
Thus, the naive investors are naive both ex ante and ex post: ex ante they take the
rating at face value, and ex post they take the results of the security at face value as
well.
An investor can purchase either one or zero unit of the security. Dene:
v  (1  (1  )p)R  r: (1)
That is, v represents the value to a naive and trusting investor when the CRA reports
m = G; whether truthfully or not. Also, let
!t = R(1  (1  t)p)  r; (2)
where t  Pr(eg j G; t) is a sophisticated investors posterior belief that the project is
good after observing a "G" rating at period t, t = 1; 2: Thus, !t represents the expected
value of a security to the sophisticated investor when the CRA reports m = G.
Following La¤ont and Tirole (1993) and Bolton et al.(2012), the second-period
payo¤ is weighted by a parameter ; which can be larger than 1. As in Bolton et
al.(2012), the parameter value  represents the importance of the future reputation
relative to the current gains for the CRA.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. At the beginning of period 1, the issuer approaches the CRA for a rating for its
security.
2. The CRA posts its rating fee , then receives a private signal, and makes a rating
of m = G or m = B.
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3. The issuer receives the rating and decides whether to buy and publish it. If the
security is not issued, there is zero payo¤ to all parties in period 1.
4. If the security is issued, investors observe its price and rating, and each decides
whether to purchase one unit or not. At the end of period 1, the investment
outcome, success or failure, is realized.
5. The game then moves to the beginning of period 2, whether or not a security is
issued in period 1. In the second period, the game in the rst period is repeated.
We will consider only pure strategies, so that the decisions by all agents are de-
terministic. Let y (resp. z) be the probability that the opportunistic CRA gives a G
(resp. B) rating to a security with good (resp. bad) signal in the rst period. Then,
with pure strategies, y; z 2 f0; 1g:
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We will discuss three possible equilibria: (1) truthful rating (y = 1; z = 1), where
the opportunistic CRA always reports the true signals in period 1; (2) rating ination
(y = 1; z = 0), where the opportunistic CRA gives G rating in period 1 regardless of
the signals; and (3) rating deation (y = 0; z = 1), where the opportunistic CRA issues
rating m = B in period 1 no matter what signals it receives.4 As it will become clear
later, the opportunistic CRA will always give the G rating in period 2.
3.1 Preliminaries
To facilitate the equilibrium characterization, we start by considering how the investors
will update their beliefs and how the CRA will charge fees with di¤erent ratings in
di¤erent periods.
3.1.1 Period 1
In period 1, note rst that the issuer will not pay for a B rating, which makes the rating
fee for a B rating equal to zero. Thus, when observing no rating (N) for the rst period,
the sophisticated investors infer that the rating which the CRA gives for the security
must be a B: Thus no security is issued for period 1. Sophisticated investors update
4The case of false reporting (y = 0; z = 0) is impossible for the CRA.
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their beliefs about the CRAs type using this information:
N1  Pr(H j N) = Pr(H j B)
=
Pr (B j H) Pr (H)
Pr (B j H) Pr (H) + Pr (B j O) Pr (O)
=
[(1  )1
2
+ 1
2
]
[(1  )1
2
+ 1
2
] + f[(1  y) + (1  )z]1
2
+ [z + (1  )(1  y)]1
2
g(1  )
=

 + (1  )(z + 1  y) ;
where Pr (H) = ; Pr (O) = 1  ;
Pr (B j H) = Pr (B j H; ~g) Pr(~g) + Pr(B j H;eb) Pr(eb) = (1  )1
2
+ 
1
2
;
Pr (B j O) = Pr (B j O; ~g) Pr(~g) + Pr(B j O;eb) Pr(eb)
= [(1  y) + (1  )z]1
2
+ [z + (1  )(1  y)]1
2
:
Next, when observing a G rating in period 1, the sophisticated investors believe
that the security in consideration is a good type with probability:
1  Pr(eg j G) = Pr (G j ~g) Pr (~g)
Pr (G j ~g) Pr (~g) + Pr

G j ~b

Pr

~b

=
 + [y + (1  ) (1  z)] (1  )
 + [y + (1  ) (1  z)] (1  ) + (1  )  + [(1  ) y +  (1  z)] (1  )
=
 + [y + (1  ) (1  z)] (1  )
 + (1  )(y + 1  z) ;
where
Pr (G j ~g) = Pr (G j ~g;H) Pr (H) + Pr (G j ~g;O) ;
Pr

G j ~b

= Pr

G j ~b;H

Pr (H) + Pr

G j ~b; O

Pr (O) :
Thus the sophisticated investors are willing to pay a price no more than !1 = R(1  
(1  1)p)  r:
Notice that the issuer can post only a single price. When receiving the G rating,
the issuer will post either price v to sell only to the naive investors, or price !1  v to
sell to all investors, with payo¤s v and !1; respectively. Under our assumption that
the monopoly CRA can extract all the surplus from the issuers, the rating fee that
CRA can charge for a G rating in the rst period is:
1 = maxfv; !1g:
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At the end of the rst period, for aG-rated security (which is issued), the investment
outcome, success (S) or failure (F ); is realized and observed by all players. The naive
investors will continue to believe the CRA if they see a success, and otherwise they will
no longer pay attention to the CRAs ratings. For the sophisticated investors, if the
CRA lied (i.e., reported G when the signal is b); their updated belief on the probability
that CRA is an honest type becomes L1 = 0; if the CRA did not lie, their updated
belief is:
S1 = 
F
1  Pr(H j G; g) =
Pr(G; g j H) Pr(H)
Pr(G; g j H) Pr(H) + Pr(G; g j O) Pr(O)
=

 + y(1  ) :
3.1.2 Period 2
In the second period, there is no more reputation concern so that the opportunistic
CRA always inates the rating. If the CRA is not found lying in the rst period,
and after observing the G rating, the sophisticated investors update beliefs that the
security is a good type:
i2  Pr(~g j G) =
Pr (G j ~g) Pr (~g)
Pr (G j ~g) Pr (~g) + Pr

G j ~b

Pr

~b

=
i1 + (1  i1)
2  i1
; i = N;L; S; F;
corresponding to the four possible situations in period 1: no security was issued; the
CRA was caught lying; the CRA reported truthfully and the security was a success
or a failure. The probability that the sophisticated investors assign to the security in
period 2 as being a good type is:
N2 =
+ (1  )(z + 1  y)
 + 2(1  )(z + 1  y) ; 
L
2 =
1
2
; S2 = 
F
2 =
+ (1  )y
 + 2(1  )y :
Therefore, the fees charged in period 2 by the CRA are, with !i2 = R(1  (1 i2)p) r
for i = S; F;N :
 S2 = maxfv; !S2 g if the rst period outcome is a success and the CRA did not
lie;
 LS2 = v if the rst period outcome is a success and the CRA lied;
 F2 = (1  )!F2 if the rst period outcome is a failure and the CRA did not lie;
and
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 N2 = maxfv; !N2 g if in the rst period the investors observed no rating.
For later analysis, we dene
w  Rf1  [1  1  (1  )
2   ]pg   r;
k  Rf1  [1  + 2(1  )
4  3 ]pg   r:
Notice that 1
2
< +2(1 )
4 3  1 (1 )2  < :We assume k > 0 for the rest of the analysis.
It follows that w  k > 0.
3.2 Equilibrium
We next discuss the three possible equilibrium strategies by the CRA in period 1:
truthful rating, rating ination, and rating deation.
3.2.1 Truthful rating
Suppose that the CRA reports truthfully in equilibrium, that is, y = 1; z = 1: The
sophisticated investorsbeliefs are consistent with the CRAs strategy, and we thus
have, for i = S;F ;N :
T1 = ; !
T
1 = v; 
T
1 = v; 
i;T
1 = ;
i;T2 =
1  (1  )
2   ; !
i;T
2 = R[1  (1  i;T2 )p]  r = w;
S;T2 = 
N;T
2 = maxfv; wg; F;T2 = (1  )w:
With the truthful-rating strategy, conditional on receiving a good signal of the security,
the CRA will report "G", and it earns:
T (G j g) = T1 + f[1  (1  )p]S;T2 + (1  )pF;T2 g
= T1 + [
S;T
2 + (1  )p(F;T2   S;T2 )]
= v + fmaxfv; wg+ (1  )p[(1  )w  maxfv; wg]g;
as the security will succeed with probability 1   (1   )p and fail with probability
(1   )p: Conditional on receiving a bad signal, the CRA will report m = B, and its
payo¤ is:
T (B j b) = N;T2 = maxfv; wg:
If the CRA deviates to reporting "B" when it receives the "g" signal, its payo¤ is:
T (B j g) = N;T2 = maxfv; wg:
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If it deviates to reporting "G" when it receives the "b" signal, its payo¤ is:
T (G j b) = T1 + (1  p)v = v + (1  p)v:
The CRA will report truthfully if and only if
T (G j g)  T (B j g)  0; (3)
and
T (B j b)  T (G j b)  0: (4)
Condition (3) holds if and only if
  v
(1  )p[maxfv; wg   (1  )w] 

T
; (5)
and condition (4) holds if and only if
  v
maxfv; wg   (1  p)v  
T : (6)
Since  > 1=2 and
maxfv; wg   (1  )w < v;
we have

T
=
v
(1  )p[maxfv; wg   (1  )w]
>
v
(1  )pv >
v
pv
 v
maxfv; wg   (1  p)v = 
T :
We have thus established:
Lemma 1 There exist values T and T ; with T < T as dened in (5) and (6), such
that truthful rating by the CRA is an equilibrium if and only if T    T :
3.2.2 Rating ination
The CRA may choose to inate ratings; that is, y = 1; z = 0: The sophisticated
investorsbeliefs are consistent with the CRAs strategy in equilibrium. In this case,
I1 =
1  (1  )
2   ; !
I
1 = R[1  (1  I1)p]  r = w; I1 = maxfv; wg;
S;I1 = 
F;I
1 = ; 
S;I
2 = 
F;I
2 =
1  (1  )
2   ;
!S;I2 = !
F;I
2 = R[1  (1  S;I2 )p]  r = w;
S;I2 = maxfv; wg; F;I2 = (1  )w:
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With the rating-ination strategy, conditional on a bad signal, the CRA will report
m = G. In this case, the CRA can collect the rating fee, but it will be found lying
by the sophisticated investors and thus they will not buy in period 2, while the naive
investors will only purchase in period 2 if the security succeeds in period 1 (which
occurs with 1  p). Therefore, the CRAs payo¤ is:
I(G j b) = I1 + (1  p)v = maxfv; wg+ (1  p)v:
Also, with the rating-ination strategy, the CRA will report m = G conditional on a
good signal, and the CRAs payo¤ in this case is:
I(G j g) = I1 + f[1  (1  )p]S;I2 + (1  )pF;I2 g
= I1 + [
S;I
2   (1  )p(S;I2   F;I2 )]
= maxfv; wg+ fmaxfv; wg   (1  )p[maxfv; wg   (1  )w]g:
In the rating-ination regime, the sophisticated investors believe that the opportunistic
CRA always reports G. Once they nd that there is no reporting, they know it must
be a B rating, and they hold the belief that the CRA giving the B-rating is an honest
type. Therefore,
N;I2 = ; !
N;I
2 = v; 
N;I
2 = v:
Then the payo¤ for the CRA to deviate to report B is:
I(B) = N;I2 = v:
Notice that I(G j g)  I(G j b): Hence, the rating-ination strategy is an equilibrium
if and only if
I(G j b)  I(B)  0;
or,
maxfv; wg+ (1  p)v   v  0;
which holds if and only if
  maxfv; wg
v   (1  p)v  
I : (7)
Therefore, rating-ination is an equilibrium strategy if and only if (7) holds. Notice
that
0 < I < T (8)
since
I =
maxfv; wg
v   (1  p)v
 v
v   (1  p)v 
v
maxfv; wg   (1  p)v = 
T :
We therefore have:
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Lemma 2 Rating ination is an equilibrium if and only if   I ; where 0 < I  T :
Thus, when the reputation concern is small, the CRA has incentive to inate ratings
for short-term gains.
3.2.3 Rating deation
The CRA may choose to deate the ratings, that is, y = 0; z = 1: In such an equilib-
rium,
D1 = 0; 
N;D
2 =
+ 2(1  )
4  3 ;
!N;D2 = R[1  (1  N;D2 )p]  r = k; N;D2 = maxfv; kg:
Note that D1 = 0 since the issuer will not pay for a B rating. With the rating-deation
strategy, conditional on receiving a good signal, the CRA reports m = B, with payo¤:
D(B j g) = N;D2 = maxfv; kg:
Conditional on receiving a bad signal, the CRA also reports m = B, and its payo¤ is:
D(B j b) = N;D2 = maxfv; kg:
In the rating-deation regime, the CRA may deviate to report m = G. Since the
sophisticated investors believe that the opportunistic CRA always deates the ratings
in this regime, once they see G report, they believe that the CRA is an honest type.
Then
i;D2 = ; !
i;D
2 = v;where i = S; F;
S;D2 = v; 
F;D
2 = (1  )v:
Therefore, this deviation when receiving a g signal brings payo¤:
D(G j g) = v + f[1  (1  )p]S;D2 + (1  )pF;D2 g
= v + [v   (1  )pv]:
Or, after receiving a bad signal, the CRA may deviate to report m = G, and the payo¤
from this deviation is:
D(G j b) = v + (1  p)v:
Notice that D(G j g)  D(G j b): Therefore, the rating-deation strategy is an
equilibrium strategy if and only if
D(B j g)  D(G j g) = maxfv; kg   fv + [v   (1  )pv]g  0;
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or
maxfv; kg   v   [v   (1  )pv]  0: (9)
Lemma 3 Assume that
 >
1
1 + (1  )p  ^: (10)
Then, given ; there exists a number
D  v
maxfv; kg   v + (1  )pv (11)
such that rating-deation is an equilibrium if and only if   D, with D  T :
Proof. Since maxfv; kg  v; maxfv; kg   v + (1  )pv > 0 if
v   v + (1  )pv > 0;
which holds if  > ^: Then, when  > ^; (9) holds if and only if
  v
maxfv; kg   v + (1  )pv  
D;
and D exists for any given  > ^: Furthermore, since maxfv; kg  maxfv; wg  v
and v  w, we have
(1  )p[maxfv; wg   (1  )w]
 (1  )p[maxfv; wg   (1  )v] = (1  )p[maxfv; wg   v] + (1  )pv
 maxfv; wg   v + (1  )pv  maxfv; kg   v + (1  )pv:
It follows that
D =
v
maxfv; kg   v + (1  )pv
 v
(1  )p[maxfv; wg   (1  )w] =

T
:
Thus, for the rating-deation equilibrium to exist, the proportion of naive investors
need to be large enough, and the CRA need to have su¢ ciently strong concerns for
reputation.
Summarizing the ndings from Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, we have our rst main result
below, providing the equilibrium characterization:
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Proposition 1 There exists ve critical values I ; T ; T ; D; and ^, with 0 < I 
T < 
T  D and 1
2
< ^ < 1; such that in equilibrium the opportunistic CRA has the
following rst-period strategies: (i) it inates the rating if and only if   I , setting
rating fee I1 = max fv; wg; (ii) it reports the true signal if and only if T    T ,
setting T1 = v; and (iii) provided that  > ^; it deates the rating if and only if
  D, setting D1 = 0.
When choosing rating strategy, the opportunistic CRA faces a trade-o¤ between
the current benet and the future reputation cost. Proposition 1 shows that when the
reputation parameter  is su¢ ciently low such that the reputation loss will be small, the
CRA inates the rating; when the reputation parameter and the proportion of naive
investors are su¢ ciently high such that the reputation loss is large, the CRA deates
the rating in order to preserve the reputation; only when the reputation parameter is
in the intermediate range, the CRA will provide truthful ratings.
Rating deation helps to preserve reputation, due to the following reason: The
private signal of the CRA is noisy. Even if the CRA reports truthfully the good
signal, the security may fail with probability (1   )p: When a G-rating security is a
failure, the naive investors will punish the CRA by ignoring its report in the future.
If the proportion of naive investors is su¢ ciently high ( > ^) and if future prot
is su¢ ciently important, by reporting m = B, the CRA gives up the current rating
fee but preserves its reputation because it will not be perceived as having inated the
rating, given that the security is not issued at all.
It is interesting that the existence of naive investors can motivate both rating-
ination and rating-deation. While the opportunistic CRA may take advantage of
the naive investorsex ante trust to inate ratings (Bolton et al., 2012), our analysis
shows that the ex post punishment by the naive investors once a G-rating security fails
may also prompt the opportunistic CRA to deate ratings. However, as we shall see
shortly, the existence of naive investors is a necessary condition for rating deation,
but not for rating ination.
The next result states how changes in the two key parameters of our model,  and
; may a¤ect the equilibrium outcome.
Corollary 1 (i) The opportunistic CRA is more likely to inate or deate its rating
when the portion of naive investors () is higher.5 (ii) Suppose that  > w
v
: Then, the
opportunistic CRA is more likely to provide truthful rating when the private signal is
more accurate (i.e.,  is higher).
5The rating deation arguement is within interval  2 (b; 1].
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Proof. (i) Since
I =
maxfv; wg
v   (1  p)v ; 
D =
v
maxfv; kg   v + (1  )pv ;
we have @
I
@
> 0; and @
D
@
< 0: It follows that the regions of parameter values that
support the rating ination equilibrium and the rating deation equilibrium are larger
when  is higher. (ii) When  > w
v
; it is straightforward to verify that @
I
@
< 0;
@T
@
< 0; @

T
@
> 0; and @
D
@
> 0: Therefore the opportunistic CRA is more likely to
provide truthful rating when  is higher.
In the rating-ination regime, the parameter value  determines the potential rev-
enue from the naive investors. Keeping other things constant, a higher  implies a
larger I , and hence there is a larger region of parameter values under which the CRA
inates the rating. In the rating-deation regime, the parameter value  determines
the punishment intensity if the G-rating security fails. Holding other things constant,
a higher  implies a smaller D, and thus there is a larger region of parameter values
under which the CRA deates the rating.
Notice that if  = 1; or if all investors are naive, then I = T = 1
p
; and T = D =
1
(1 )p : That is, the four critical values, 
I ; T ; 
T
; and D; are reduced to two, but
the three regimes for rating-ination, truthful-rating and rating-deation still exist.
However, if  = 0; or if all investors are sophisticated, then I = w
v
and T = v
w
;
there is rating ination if  < w
v
; and there is truthful rating if   v
w
; but there is
no rating deation. Hence the presence of naive investors is necessary for equilibrium
rating deation but not necessary for rating ination.
Corollary 1 also says that when the private signal is more accurate ( is higher),
the CRA will be more likely to report the true signal, provided that the proportion of
naive investors is su¢ ciently large ( > w
v
). This is intuitive, because a more accurate
private signal implies a higher cost of mis-reporting, increasing the incentive for truthful
rating.
We also notice that when p is small (more likely in boom), rating ination is more
likely to happen; when p is large (more likely in recession), rating deation is more
likely to happen. We formalize this observation in the next section.
4 Ratings and Business Cycle
In this section we introduce state variables to discuss the relationship between credit
ratings and the business cycle. Suppose there are two states s 2 fh; lg; where h
corresponds to high economic activities or a boom, and l to low economic activities or
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a recession. We assume that the probability of failure for the securities is lower under
boom than under recession: ph < pl. For simplicity, everything else is assumed to be
the same in the two state. It follows that vh > vl; wh > wl; and kh > kl:
Let s be the probability that the current state s will remain in the next period.
Then 1 s is the transition probability from the current state s to the other state. For
 s 2 fh; lg and  s 6= s; if s = 1   s, the state in each period is an i.i.d draw from
the same distribution; if s > 1    s; there is a positive correlation between states;
and if s < 1   s, there is a negative correlation between states. A higher s means
a longer duration for the state s and a slow move to the other state. The following is
the transition matrix:
h l
h h 1  h
l 1  l l
The transition matrix and the nature of the state in each period are assumed to be
public information. Denote:
vs  svs + (1  s)v s;
ws  sws + (1  s)w s;
ks  sks + (1  s)k s:
Then, given that the current state is s; vs is the expected willingness to pay by a trusting
naive investor for the G-rated security in the next period; ws is the expected willingness
to pay by a sophisticated investor, when the CRA was truthful in the current period,
for the G-rated security in the next period; and ks is the expected willingness to pay
by a sophisticated investor, when the CRA gave a B-rating in the current period, for
the G-rated security in the next period. We further dene, for s 2 fh; lg:
Is 
maxfvs; wsg
vs   (1  ps)vs ;
Ts =
vs
maxfvs; wsg   (1  ps)vs ;

T
s 
vs
(1  )ps[maxfvs; wsg   (1  )ws] ;
Ds 
vs
maxfvs; ksg   vs + (1  )psvs
:
Then, similarly as in the previous section, we have
Is  Ts < Ts  Ds :
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Also, let
^s =
1
1 + (1  )ps for s = h; l;
then ^l < ^h: Using the same arguments leading to Proposition 1, we immediately
have:
Lemma 4 Suppose that the state in period 1 is s 2 fh; lg: Then the opportunistic
CRAs equilibrium strategy in period 1 is: (i) it inates the rating if and only if s  Is,
setting the rating fee I1;s = maxfvs; wsg; (ii) it reports the true signal if and only if
Ts  s  
T
s , setting 
T
1;s = vs; and (iii) provided that  > ^h; it deates the rating if
and only if s  Ds , setting D1;s = 0.
Similar to Proposition 1, when the reputation parameter s is su¢ ciently small,
the CRA inates the rating; when the reputation parameter and the proportion of
naive investors are su¢ ciently large (s > ^h), the CRA deates the rating; when the
reputation parameter is in the intermediate range, the CRA reports the true signal.
Proposition 2 below states our second main result, connecting ratings to business
cycles.
Proposition 2 Rating ination is more likely to happen in a boom; and there exists
 2 (0; 1); such that for  > , rating deation is more likely to happen in a recession.
Proof. We can rewrite Is  Is(s; ps) and Ds  Ds (s; ps), where s 2 fh; lg.
(1) We show that Ih(h; ph) > 
I
l (l; pl); which would imply that the equilibrium
condition for rating ination is more likely to be satised in state h than in state l:
First, since @vh
@h
> 0; @vl
@l
< 0; and given
Is =
maxfvs; wsg
vs   (1  ps)vs =
maxfvs; wsg
[1  (1  ps)]
1
vs
;
we have
@Ih(h; ph)
@h
< 0 and
@Il (l; pl)
@l
> 0:
It follows that Ih(h; ph)  Ih(1; ph) and Il (1; pl)  Il (l; pl).
Next, since ph < pl;
wh
vh
> wl
vl
; we have
Ih(1; ph) =
maxfvh; whg
vh   (1  ph)vh >
maxfvl; wlg
vl   (1  pl)vl = 
I
l (1; pl):
Therefore
Ih(h; ph)  Ih(1; ph) > Il (1; pl)  Il (l; pl);
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or Ih(h; ph) > 
I
l (l; pl):
(2) We show that there exists  2 (0; 1); suvh that for  > , Dh (h; ph) > Dl (l; pl):
This would imply that the equilibrium condition for rating deation is more likely to
be satised in state l than in state h:
First, suppose that maxfvs; ksg = vs: Then,
Ds 
vs
maxfvs; ksg   vs + (1  )psvs
=
vs
   1 + (1  )ps
1
vs
:
Hence, since @vh
@h
> 0 and @vl
@l
< 0; we have @
D
h (h;ph)
@h
< 0 and @
D
l (l;pl)
@l
> 0.
Next, suppose that maxfvs; ksg = ks: Then, Ds = vsks vs+(1 )psvs . Since
@[ks   vs + (1  )psvs]
@s
= (ks   k s)  [1  (1  )ps](vs   v s)
= R(p s   ps)f(1  N;D2 )  [1  (1  )ps](1  )g
and
(1  N;D2 )  [1  (1  )ps](1  ) > (1  N;D2 )  (1  ) =   N;D2 > 0;
we have @
D
h (h;ph)
@h
< 0 and @
D
l (l;pl)
@l
> 0. It follows that Dh (h; ph)  Dh (1; ph) and
Dl (1; pl)  Dl (l; pl).
Next, we show that there exists  2 (0; 1) such that for  > , Dh (1; ph) > Dl (1; pl).
If maxfvs; ksg = vs, or   khvh ; then
Dh (1; ph) =
vh
vh   vh + (1  )phvh =
1
   1 + (1  )ph
>
1
   1 + (1  )pl = 
D
l (1; pl):
Dene   maxfkh
vh
; ^hg. Then there exists 0 <  < 1 such that for   , Dh (h; ph) >
Dl (l; pl).
Remarkably, regardless of whether the states are independent or correlated across
periods, we have Ih > 
I
l and 
D
h > 
D
l ; that is, the range of parameter values for
the equilibrium of rating ination is larger in a boom, whereas the range of parameter
values for the equilibrium of rating deation is larger in a recession. In this sense,
CRAs credit ratings are procyclical: rating ination is more likely to happen in a
boom, while rating deation is more likely to happen in a recession.
The intuition for the procyclical-rating result is as follows. Since the probability
of failure for the bad security is lower in a boom than in a recession (ph < pl), the
expected payo¤of issuing the security (and hence also the CRAs rating fee) is higher in
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the boom than in the recession (vh > vl; wh > wl; and kh > kl). Consequently, relative
to in a recession, in a boom the current gain from rating ination is higher, and the
expected reputation cost of rating ination is also lower. Therefore, the opportunistic
CRA has more incentive to inate the ratings in a boom. On the other hand, the
current loss from rating deation is lower in a recession than in a boom. Thus, the
opportunistic CRA is more likely to deate ratings in a recession in order to reap the
future gain.
5 Conclusion
CRAs have been under intense scrutiny since the recent global nancial crisis. They
were initially criticized for their favorable pre-crisis ratings of insolvent nancial in-
stitutions like Lehman Brothers and AIG, as well as risky mortgage-related securities
that contributed to the collapse of the U.S. housing market. When the crisis started,
the CRAs began to massively downgrade the ratings for many securities, companies,
as well as countries.
Exiting literature as well as business practitioners have two competing views re-
garding the CRAsbehavior: some argue that they engage in rating ination, while
others think they deate the ratings. This article provides an analysis that reconciles
the two opposite arguments. We nd that both rating ination and rating deation
can occur in equilibrium. In addition, we nd that credit rating is procyclical: rating
ination is more likely to happen in a boom while rating deation is more likely to
happen in a recession.
Our procyclical rating result is consistent with some recent empirical works. Several
recent papers have documented evidences that ratings ination is more likely to hap-
pen during booms. Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010) point out the
issuance volume of MBS went up sharply between 2005-2007 while rating accuracy de-
creased, and later rating downgrades for the 2005-2007 cohorts were signicantly larger
than for the previous one. Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) show that there were mas-
sive pre-crisis upgrading compared to the massive downgrading during the subprime
crisis. In an earlier study, Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz (1999) demonstrate that during the
East Asian nancial crisis, CRAsratings were procyclical: Having failed to predict
the emergence of the crisis, CRAs became excessively conservative. They downgraded
East Asian crisis countries more than these countrieseconomic fundamentals would
justify.
As a response to the CRAsmoral hazard problem, the US government has at-
tempted to improve or tighten the regulation. Subtitle C in Title IX of The Dodd
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Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act focuses entirely on the regu-
lation of CRAs, referred to as Nationally recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
(NRSROs). Some key elements of the provisions in Title IX Subsection C are:
 Disclosure. NRSROs are required to disclose their rating track records, their
rating methodologies, and their use of third parties for due diligence e¤orts.
 Liability. Investors can bring private rights of action against CRAs for a knowing
or reckless failure to conduct a reasonable investigation of the facts or to obtain
analysis from an independent source.
 Deregister. The SEC has the authority to deregister any agency for providing
bad ratings over time.
These requirements are likely to increase CRAse¤orts and reduce the moral hazard
problem. For example, the disclosure principle allows investors to have more informa-
tion, and thus to make more rational judgements when using credit ratings. However,
these requirements mainly target rating ination, and may exacerbate the problem of
rating deation. Facing legal liability, CRAs may reduce the number of ratings as well
as increase the downward bias in ratings (Goel and Thakor, 2010), which could hurt
the issuers. It seems that more studies are needed with regard to the consequences of
the legislation.
Most of the recent literature, both theoretical and empirical, focus on the rating
ination occurred before the nancial crisis. But we do observe the phenomenon that
when the crisis started, the CRAs became much more conservative by massively down-
grading the ratings. Is the downgrading merely a correction to the previous rating
ination? Or does it involve rating deation, downgrading more than the fundamen-
tals would justify? Are there rating cycles, and are ratings procyclical? Given that
credit ratings serve as public coordinating devices and that downgrading has major
impacts in nancial markets (Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits, 2005), this article calls
for more research on these critical issues.
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